Contributory Liability Under the ACPA: A More Effective Approach to Deterring Cybersquatting at Its Source by Piombino, Andrew J.
Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 1 Vol. 22: No. 1 (Winter 2017) Article 9
Winter 2017
Contributory Liability Under the ACPA: A More
Effective Approach to Deterring Cybersquatting at
Its Source
Andrew J. Piombino
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams
University Law Review by an authorized editor of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Piombino, Andrew J. (2017) "Contributory Liability Under the ACPA: A More Effective Approach to Deterring Cybersquatting at Its
Source," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 22 : Iss. 1 , Article 9.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol22/iss1/9
  
327 
 
Contributory Liability Under the 
ACPA:  A More Effective Approach to 
Deterring Cybersquatting at Its 
Source 
Andrew J. Piombino 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue of contributory cybersquatting arises from the 
enactment of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
(ACPA) in 1999, which created a cause of action for registering, 
trafficking in, or using an internet domain name confusingly 
similar to, or dilutive of, a trademark or personal name.1  The 
statute was enacted primarily to combat those who register 
domain names with the intent to hold them, and later sell them, 
at a premium to those who would actually make use of the domain 
name.2  The statute permits a trademark owner to bring an action 
against a person who, with a bad faith intent to profit from a 
mark, registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that is 
confusingly similar to the protected mark.3  The statute also lays 
out several factors for determining whether there is bad faith, and 
creates an in rem civil action against the domain name.4  Since its 
inception, the statute has been used as a tool to take action 
against those who make a business out of ransoming domain 
names by buying them, running skeleton websites and demanding 
large buyout costs from those who own trademarks in the subject 
 
 1. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254). 
 2. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999). 
 3. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (Westlaw). 
 4. Id.  
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of the domain name and seek to run a legitimate website.5  It has 
only in a few instances, however, been used to demand relief from 
those large domain registrars that passively support 
cybersquatting activity.6 
Since the creation of the statute, several plaintiffs have 
attempted to extend the reach of the statute by suing domain 
registrars and hosting services for catering to cybersquatters.7  
Several district courts have weighed in on the issue with varying 
results, but only one case has made it to a United States appeals 
court.8  That case, Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, 
Inc., was a Ninth Circuit case that came down in December 2013.9  
There, a Malaysian petroleum company, known colloquially as 
“Petronas,” sued GoDaddy for registering and providing 
forwarding services to a cybersquatter using the name 
www.petronastowers.com, even after Petronas requested that 
GoDaddy take down the domain name.10  The Ninth Circuit 
declined to create and apply an action for contributory 
cybersquatting against GoDaddy, offering several rationales: 
(1) the text of the Act does not apply to the conduct that 
would be actionable under such a theory; (2) Congress did 
not intend to implicitly include common law doctrines 
applicable to trademark infringement because the ACPA 
created a new cause of action that is distinct from 
traditional trademark remedies; and (3) allowing suits 
against registrars for contributory cybersquatting would 
not advance the goals of the statute.11 
 
 5. Christine A. Walczak, The New and Evolving Tort of Contributory 
Cybersquatting: Did the Courts Get It Right?, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 
531, 535 (2012). 
 6. See, e.g., Acad. of Motion Pictures Arts & Scis. v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 
No. CV 10-03738, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120871, at *66-67 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 
10, 2015) (discussing whether GoDaddy acted with the requisite bad faith 
intent to find the company liable under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act); Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Above.com Pty, Ltd., 881 F. Supp. 2d 
1173, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (concluding that contributory liability exists 
under the ACPA). 
 7. See, e.g., Acad. of Motion Pictures Arts & Scis., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
120871, at *66-67; Verizon Cal., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1179. 
 8. See Petroliam Nasional Berhad, (Petronas) v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 
F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 9. Id. at 546. 
 10. Id. at 548. 
 11. Id. at 550.  
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Implicit in this reasoning was a concern that registrars might 
be overburdened and more restricted in issuing new domain 
names if they had to divine the intent of those seeking to register 
domain names.12  Further, the court, and many supporters of 
registrars think that the mechanisms in place for in rem suits and 
arbitration under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy (UDRP) are more than sufficient to combat the problem.13  
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in October 
2014, likely due in large part to the lack of a circuit split, as only 
one appeals court had ruled on the issue.14 
This note will argue that Petronas was decided incorrectly, 
and that the intent, language, and policy behind the ACPA 
implicitly creates an action for contributory cybersquatting 
against domain name registrars and hosting services that is 
necessary to protect the rights of trademark owners and beneficial 
for the streamlining of domain name disputes.  Part I will provide 
an overview of the pervasive problem of cybersquatting, the 
response of Congress enacting the ACPA, and ACPA’s effects on 
cybersquatting activities.  It will address the statute’s failure to 
speedily and properly protect trademark owners from 
cybersquatting as it is currently interpreted.  Additionally, it will 
illustrate how those failures play out in the context of the 
Petronas case.  Part II will argue that the history and nature of 
the ACPA implicitly creates an action for contributory 
cybersquatting by illustrating the history behind the act, 
comparing the addition of the ACPA to codification of trademark 
infringement as a whole, which allows for contributory liability 
under common law principles.  Part III will argue that the goals of 
the ACPA support an action for contributory liability based on the 
statutory construction, the legislative history, and the goals 
driving the act.  It will refute the policy arguments concerning an 
overly burdensome system for domain name registrars if they are 
required to divine the intent of potential domain owners, and the 
concern for rejection of domain registration for those who may not 
be acting in bad faith.  Lastly, it will argue that the interests of 
trademark owners are not adequately protected by in rem 
provisions where damages are necessary to make them whole, and 
 
 12. See id. at 553. 
 13. Id. at 554. 
 14. Id. at 546, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 55 (2014). 
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that creating the action will incentivize domain name registrars to 
eliminate cybersquatters without the need for litigation.  Finally, 
Part IV will conclude that the Supreme Court should take up this 
issue, and allow for an action for contributory cybersquatting for 
the protection of trademark owners and for purposes of expediency 
in resolving cybersquatting issues.  It will propose that the 
Supreme Court might limit contributory liability by creating a 
more robust interpretation of the bad faith standard. 
I. THE ELUSIVE PROBLEMS OF CYBERSQUATTING 
Cybersquatting is a term that encompasses a series of 
practices plaguing trademark owners in the internet age, and that 
continues to threaten to hijack and undermine the goodwill of 
trademark owners, and in some cases even to extort them.15  The 
most common, and perhaps the earliest form, is the traditional 
cybersquatter, a person who registers a domain name including a 
well-known trademark for the purpose of selling the name to the 
trademark owner, often at an exorbitant price.16  Other practices 
that are subsumed under the title of cybersquatting include 
“typosquatting,” whereby a person registers misspellings of a 
trademark as a domain name in order to direct those who misspell 
a domain name to a different website, and “cyberpirating,” where 
a person uses the goodwill of the trademark to lure web users to a 
site, either by having it redirect to a different site, or merely 
connecting ad revenue from visitors to a fake one.17  Given the 
range of damage these different types of cybersquatting can cause 
based on their unique functions, the threat to a trademark holder 
is often far greater than the loss of money from being forced to 
buyout a cybersquatter, and can include tarnishment of the 
trademark and lost business opportunities.18 
At the time of the enactment of the ACPA on November 29, 
1999, it was clear that the mechanisms by which courts had dealt 
with cybersquatting activity up to that point were not sufficient, 
 
 15. See Robert L. Mitchell, How Cybersquatters Tarnish Brand Names, 
PC WORLD (Sept. 8, 2009, 1:47 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/ 
171601/how_cybersquatters_tarnish_brand_names.html. 
 16. See Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (N.D. Ill. 
1996). 
 17. Tenesa S. Scaturro, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
and the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy the First Decade: 
Looking Back and Adapting Forward, 11 NEV. L.J. 877, 880 (2011). 
 18. Id. at 885; see also Mitchell, supra note 15.  
2017] CONTRIBUTORY CYBERSQUATTING 331 
since cybersquatters had become increasingly sophisticated in 
navigating loopholes in trademark infringement and dilution 
statutes, and because remedies under those statutes were 
uncertain and often very expensive to prosecute.19  The ACPA was 
created as a response, with the intention that it would close those 
loopholes by creating a more narrowly tailored statute which 
protects trademark owners from many types of cybersquatting 
uses by removing the “commercial use” requirement under the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FDTA), while also creating a 
counterbalance by requiring bad faith in the alleged 
cybersquatter.20  While the statute effectively addressed many of 
the concerns of the legislature at the time, it has been decidedly 
lacking in its ability to address the complicity of domain name 
registrars, who profit from registrations, and often hold the keys 
to speedy relief for trademark holders.21  Domain name registrars 
are organizations that have been accredited by the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) or a 
national country code top-level domain (TLD) (such as .uk or .ca) 
to register domain names.22  These companies sell domain names 
to the public, and act as a liaison between the consumer and 
domain registries such as VeriSign, which manages the 
 
 19. Scaturro, supra note 17, at 883. 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) provides, in relevant part: 
(1)(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a 
mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under 
this section, if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties, 
that person– 
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a 
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section; and 
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that – 
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of 
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly 
similar to that mark; 
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of 
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly 
similar to or dilutive of that mark; or 
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason 
of section 706 of Title 18 or section 220506 of Title 36. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (Westlaw). 
 21.  See id. 
 22. GODADDY, https://www.godaddy.com/help/what-is-the-differencebet 
ween-a-registry-registrar-and-registrant-8039 (last visited Aug. 31, 2016).  
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registration of .com domain names.23  Often, registrars such as 
GoDaddy.com also offer hosting and forwarding services, whereby 
they can provide servers to host a registrant’s website, or cause 
the domain name to forward web users to a different domain name 
that the registrant owns.24  Registrars, by their many functions, 
exercise a great deal of power over the registration and 
maintenance of domains.  For that reason, many domain holders 
seek relief from domain registrars in attempting to attain a 
speedy resolution for cybersquatting claims.25  This is particularly 
true where domain name holders are difficult to find, procedurally 
difficult to sue, or nonresponsive to attempted communications 
regarding the alleged cybersquatting.26  Unfortunately, both the 
ACPA and the UDRP provide potential hurdles to those who seek 
relief from domain name registrars.27 
An apt illustration of this issue playing out is in Petronas, 
where a cybersquatter used GoDaddy.com as its registrar.28  In 
2007, a third party who had registered the names 
petronastower.net and petronastowers.net transferred its 
registration service to GoDaddy.29  Using GoDaddy’s name 
forwarding service, the third party directed web traffic from those 
domain names to an adult website called camfunchat.com.30  In 
2009, Petronas officials contacted GoDaddy and requested that it 
“take action against the website associated with the 
‘petronastower.net’ domain name.”31  GoDaddy conducted an 
investigation, but refused to take action on what was a clear 
cybersquatting violation because it did not host the site, and 
because it claimed it was prevented under the UDRP from 
participating in trademark disputes regarding domain name 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Petroliam Nasional Berhad, (Petronas) v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 
F.3d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. at 554.  
 27. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254); 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, INTERNET CORPORATION 
FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN), https://www.icann.org/ 
resources/ pages/policy-2012-02-25-en (last visited Aug. 31, 2016); Scaturro, 
supra note 17, at 899.  
 28. 737 F.3d at 548. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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ownership.32  In spite of almost certain violations of the standards 
of the ACPA and the similar standards of the UDRP, GoDaddy did 
nothing.  In response, Petronas sued, attempting to persuade the 
court to read a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting into 
the ACPA.33  Despite the existence of persuasive case law in the 
California District Courts supporting claims for contributory 
cybersquatting, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that: 
(1) the text of the Act does not apply to the conduct that 
would be actionable under such a theory; (2) Congress did 
not intend to implicitly include common law doctrines 
applicable to trademark infringement because the ACPA 
created a new cause of action that is distinct from 
traditional trademark remedies; and (3) allowing suits 
against registrars for contributory cybersquatting would 
not advance the goals of the statute.34 
For the reasons stated below however, it is clear that the 
court’s analysis is not supported by analogies to the creation of 
contributory liability actions in trademark infringement, the 
legislative history, the statutory construction, or the policies that 
drive the statute. 
II. THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE ACPA IMPLICITLY CREATES AN 
ACTION FOR CONTRIBUTORY CYBERSQUATTING 
Several district courts had considered the issue of whether an 
action for contributory cybersquatting existed, and many had 
 
 32. See id.  The UDRP is an alternative dispute resolution process that 
was adopted by ICANN in 1999.  Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy, INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN), 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en (last visited Aug. 
31, 2016). It establishes by mandatory contractual obligation, an expedited 
and inexpensive arbitration process for resolving cybersquatting claims.  Id. 
It also provides that registrars need only intervene in a cybersquatting 
dispute upon order of a court or an arbitration decision.  Id.  While certainly 
more efficient than a lawsuit against a cybersquatter under the ACPA, a 
UDRP arbitration action can take 50-60 days to resolve, a period during 
which the infringing website remains up and running.  Id.; see also Charles 
Runyan, 6 Ways to Recover a Domain Name from an Infringing 
Cybersquatter, DOMAINSHERPA (last updated Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.domainsherpa.com/6-ways-to-recover-a-domain-name-from-an-inf 
ringing-cybersquatter/.  For many trademark holders, even such a short 
period of time can inflict irreparable damage to their mark.  
 33. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 549-50. 
 34. Id. at 550. 
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answered in the affirmative.35  Those courts that have applied 
contributory liability have relied on an analogy to Inwood Labs, 
Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., a 1982 Supreme Court case that created an 
action for secondary liability for trademark infringement under 
the Lanham Act.36  There, the Court considered the statute as 
legislated against the backdrop of common law tort liability rules, 
taking into account those tort principles as applied to trademark 
dilution actions at common law.37  It reasoned that the legislature 
intended to incorporate those common law principles into the 
statute, despite the fact that neither the statute, nor the 
legislative history suggested that such common law principles 
were  a consideration.38 
In spite of that decision, and the fact that the ACPA was 
created as a part of the Lanham Act, under the same umbrella of 
trademark protection, the Petronas Court dismissed the ACPA as 
creating a new and distinct cause of action that should not be 
afforded the same incorporation of broad common law tort 
principles.39  In doing so, the court ignored the principle that 
“[s]tatutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a 
presumption favoring the retention of long-established and 
familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the 
contrary is evident.”40  Instead, the court contrasted the ACPA 
from the Lanham Act as a whole, reasoning that, prior to the 
enactment of the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court had recognized 
 
 35. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 
983 (9th Cir. 1999); Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Above.com Pty, Ltd., 881 F. Supp. 2d 
1173, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Solid Host, NL v. NameCheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 
2d 1092, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., 
177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 646 (E.D. Mich. 2001).  
 36. 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) (“[I]f a manufacturer or distributor 
intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to 
supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in 
trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorily 
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.”).  The Lanham Act 
codified the trademark laws that existed at its time of passing in 1946.  It has 
then since been amended by the ACPA to add new cybersquatting causes of 
action.  See Petronas, 737 F.3d at 549.  
 37. Inwood Labs, 456 U.S. at 854. See also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 
285 (2002) (“[W]hen Congress creates a tort action, it legislates against a 
legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious liability rules and 
consequently intends its legislation to incorporate those rules.”). 
 38. Inwood Labs, 456 U.S. at 854.  
 39. 737 F.3d 546, 553 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 40. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). 
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a common law theory of contributory liability into the law of 
trademarks and unfair competition.41  Conversely, no such 
common law theory had been recognized for cybersquatting.42  
Since cybersquatting was considered a new and distinct action, 
the court reasoned that it should not receive the benefits of 
common law contributory liability.43  Further, the court reasoned 
that since the ACPA and trademark infringement bear distinct 
elements—namely that trademark infringement requires 
commercial use by the alleged infringer, while the ACPA does not, 
and that the ACPA requires bad faith, while trademark 
infringement does not—the statutes create different rights, and 
thus are not entitled to the same common law incorporation.44 
This narrow view, however, does not consider the fact that, as 
mentioned above, prior to the enactment of the ACPA, 
cybersquatting type claims were litigated under traditional 
trademark infringement and anti-dilution claims.45 Although no 
cases expressly apply or even allege contributory liability under 
those circumstances, presumably given the fulfillment of the 
elements of an infringement or unfair competition claim, a court 
would have applied contributory liability under that statute.46  
Indeed, even the Petronas Court concedes that “trademark holders 
may still bring claims for traditional direct or contributory 
trademark infringement that arises from cybersquatting 
activities” under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(3).47  That the legislature 
sought to create a more narrowly tailored law, while intentionally 
placing it within the Lanham Act, which until the enactment of 
the ACPA was implied to have incorporated contributory claims in 
its entirety, should not preclude it from receiving the benefits of 
broad tort theories of contributory liability.48  Moreover, the fact 
that the cybersquatting action did not exist during the time that 
the common law underlying the Lanham Act was developing does 
not preclude it from adopting those basic principles that underlie 
 
 41. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 552. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 552–53. 
 45. Scaturro, supra note 17, at 883. 
 46. See Petronas, 737 F.3d at 552. 
 47. Id. at 554 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(3)). 
 48. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982); S. 
REP. NO. 106-140, at 1 (1999). 
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the act as a whole. Clearly, the legislature could have thought that 
the ACPA was sufficiently similar to the rest of the Lanham Act to 
be subsumed as an amendment within it, rather than being 
created as a separate statutory section, and thus it is reasonably 
inferred that it meant for the same underlying tort principles to 
apply.49  Furthermore, the distinction, which is based on differing 
elements, is far too narrow and arbitrary a distinction, 
particularly because the discrete requirements of infringement 
claims and defenses under the Lanham Act do not mirror their 
common law predecessors exactly, but are still afforded the 
implication of contributory liability.50 
The Ninth Circuit also concludes that the plain language of 
the ACPA precludes a cause of action for contributory 
cybersquatting.51  The court begins by invoking the canon of 
statutory interpretation, which requires the court to “presume 
that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means 
in a statute what it says there.”52  The court reasoned that by 
employing the language to impose liability on those that “‘register 
[ ], traffic[ ] in, or use[ ] a domain name’ with the ‘bad faith intent 
to profit’ from that protected mark,”53 the plain language limits 
the circumstances under which one can be found liable for 
cybersquatting to those who directly commit these acts, as 
opposed to one who aids and abets them.54  The court took issue 
with extending liability to include merely complicit registrars, 
whose acts were unmotivated by a bad faith intent to profit, as 
opposed to direct cybersquatters who demonstrated bad faith 
intent.55 
On its face, this does appear to be a problem.  However, 
looking to interpretations of contributory liability for trademark 
infringement under the Lanham Act and adapting them in light of 
the bad faith requirement, the language can be reconciled.  In the 
same way that there is no express provision in the plain language 
 
 49. See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 1–4 (1999) (modernizing sections of the 
Lanham Act by including online intellectual property, such as domains, into 
the statutory framework). 
 50. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–254). 
 51. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 550. 
 52. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). 
 53. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 550 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i)–(ii)) 
(alteration in original). 
 54. Id. at 550–51. 
 55. Id.  
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of the ACPA for contributory liability, there is also no such 
language in the Lanham Act relating to infringement.56  Despite 
the lack of direct language, the Inwood Court imported common 
law principles in determining that the contributor is liable: (1) 
when he “intentionally induces another to infringe on a 
trademark,” or (2) when he “continues to supply its product to one 
whom [he] knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark 
infringement . . . .”57 In order to avoid an overextension of 
contributory liability in light of the language of the statute, 
subsequent courts refined the test, particularly in Lockheed 
Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., which held that a 
defendant can be held contributorily liable only if he created a 
marketplace wherein infringement was occurring and he exercised 
a sufficient degree of control and monitoring over the infringer’s 
means of infringement.58  In doing so, the court was able to import 
the common law tort theory into the statute, while crafting it in 
such a way as to avoid contradicting the statute, by including only 
language that almost equates to a participation in the 
infringement.59 
District courts have employed the same method to formulate 
an action for contributory cybersquatting.60  In Ford Motor Co. v. 
GreatDomains.com, Inc., the court determined that a plaintiff 
could establish a cause of action under the necessary marketplace 
analysis, but found that the plaintiffs in that case did not meet the 
high threshold set forth by the bad faith requirement.61  In 
importing bad faith into a contributory liability context, the court 
added that the “plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the 
‘cyber-landlord’ knew or should have known that its vendors had 
no legitimate reason for having registered the disputed domain 
names in the first place.”62  The court also considered whether the 
contributor profited off of the use of the marketplace for 
 
 56. See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-
254). 
 57. 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
 58. 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999).  This analysis is often referred to 
as the “necessary market analysis.” 
 59. See id. 
 60. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 
635, 646–47 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 61. Id. at 647. 
 62. Id. 
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cybersquatting purposes.63  This high bar ensured that the plain 
language of the statute remained in force, while incorporating 
common law tort liability principles. 
In spite of the practical and flexible interpretations offered by 
California district courts, the Ninth Circuit instead chooses to 
adopt an intensely narrow analysis, focusing merely on the 
absence of express language in the statute pointing to 
contributory liability.64  In doing so, it removes the ACPA from its 
statutory and common law context, considering it in isolation 
based merely on a limited and shortsighted construction of the 
language of the statute.  Were the same analysis applied with 
regard to the rest of the Lanham Act, the well settled proposition 
that contributory liability applies in trademark infringement suits 
would be entirely undermined, as it similarly lacks express 
language regarding contributory liability.65  It does not make 
sense that a mere variation of the same statutory section would be 
subject to a different type of language analysis, especially where 
an application of the same analysis yields a result that comports 
perfectly well with the language of the statute, given only a slight 
variation based on the interpretation of good faith. 
III. THE GOALS OF THE ACT SUPPORT AN ACTION FOR CONTRIBUTORY 
LIABILITY 
The final reason that the Petronas Court offers for not 
extending contributory liability to cybersquatting is that creating 
such an action does not further the goals of the statute as 
articulated by the senate report.66  The court points out that the 
statute was enacted “in order to ‘protect consumers . . . and to 
provide clarity in the law for trademark owners by prohibiting the 
bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks . . . .’”67  
 
 63. Id. at 648–49. 
 64. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 551. 
 65. See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-
254). 
 66. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 553–54; see S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 4, 7–9 
(1999) (the senate report specifically outlines the purpose and analysis of the 
statute’s enactment, and notably never raises nor discusses the idea of 
contributory liability). 
 67. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 553 (quoting S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4).  “The 
purpose of the bill is to protect consumers and American businesses, to 
promote the growth of online commerce, and to provide clarity in the law for 
trademark owners by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive registration of 
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The court also focuses on the statutory provision which states: 
The bill is carefully and narrowly tailored, however, to 
extend only to cases where the plaintiff can demonstrate 
that the defendant registered, trafficked in, or used the 
offending domain name with bad-faith intent to profit 
from the goodwill of a mark belonging to someone else.  
Thus, the bill does not extend to innocent domain name 
registrations by those who are unaware of another’s use 
of the name, or even to someone who is aware of the 
trademark status of the name but registers a domain 
name containing the mark for any reason other than with 
bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill associated 
with that mark.68 
The court construes this purpose as an intention to impose a 
strict limitation “on who can be liable for cybersquatting and in 
what circumstances.”69  While this may be true, a construction of 
the statute which requires the “exceptional circumstances” 
contemplated by GreatDomains, creates a similar limitation, 
focusing more on the conduct of the defendants rather than their 
degree of participation relative to the actual cybersquatting.70  
The limitation is assuredly narrow, shielding domain name 
registrars who register cybersquatters merely as an oversight, 
while really only applying to the types of scenarios where, like in 
Petronas, the registrar is informed of a particularly egregious case 
of cybersquatting,  and the registrar does nothing while it 
continues to derive additional revenue from services such as 
redirecting and hosting.71 Petronas also alludes to, as other 
authors have likewise noted, that there was an additional 
Congressional intent to limit the scope of the ACPA so as “to 
ensure that any remedies do not impede or stifle the free flow of 
information on the Internet.”72 
There are several concerns that might be raised.  First, 
 
distinctive marks as Internet domain names with the intent to profit from the 
goodwill associated with such marks—a practice commonly referred to as 
‘cybersquatting.’”  S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 4. 
 68. S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 12–13; see Petronas, 737 F.3d at 553. 
 69. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 553. 
 70. Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 647 
(E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 71. See id.; Petronas, 737 F.3d at 548. 
 72. Walczak, supra note 5, at 556; see Petronas, 737 F.3d at 553–54. 
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creating contributory liability might force domain name registrars 
to make a determination as to bad faith prior to registering a 
domain name, thus slowing down the registration process.73  Next, 
registrars might have to monitor domain names more closely, 
which is extremely difficult given the number of domains 
companies like GoDaddy maintain.74  Finally, “imposing 
contributory liability for cybersquatting would incentivize ‘false 
positives,’ in which the lawful use of a domain name is restricted 
by a risk-averse third party service provider that receives a 
seemingly valid take-down request from a trademark holder.”75 
While these concerns have a degree of validity to them, it is 
important to consider them in practice, and also to consider the 
countervailing policy issues that result when the government fails 
to hold registrars accountable.  First, as mentioned above, under 
the type of high bar set forth in GreatDomains, finding 
contributory liability would be a rare occurrence, extending to 
those circumstances where registrars exercised a degree of control 
greater than a mere one-time registration, or where registrars had 
actual or constructive knowledge of blatant cybersquatting 
activities.76  The statute as interpreted does not target those 
innocent parties contemplated by the senate report, and instead 
targets those who demonstrate a reckless complicity in 
cybersquatting activity.77  Rooting out these types of users is 
likely not as difficult as one might think.  Dissidents lament that 
registrars will be forced to conduct the nine-part test that the 
ACPA statute sets out for determining bad faith, which they claim 
would be a nearly impossible task.78  However, the statute as 
interpreted by the modified necessary market analysis in 
GreatDomains does not require such a meticulous review and 
monitoring of domains, merely that the registrar take notice of the 
activities of domains over which it has a significant degree of 
control, and where registrants have no legitimate reason for 
 
 73. Walczak, supra note 5, at 556.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 553. 
 76. Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 647 
(E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 77. See id. at 641–42. 
 78. Petronas, 737 F.3d at 553.  The referenced statute pertains to 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B) and the statute’s non-exhaustive nine-factor test that 
the statute lays out to help determine whether a person has acted in bad 
faith.  Id. 
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having registered the disputed domain names to begin with.79  
Thus, the registrars would only have to conduct such an analysis 
in a limited number of scenarios, such as the one in Petronas, 
where GoDaddy provided hosting and forwarding services to the 
cybersquatter, the domain name mirrored exactly the 
trademarked name of a large corporation, and GoDaddy was 
notified of the cybersquatting.80 
Whatever inconvenience additional monitoring creates for the 
massive companies that register domain names will likely be far 
outweighed by the benefit received by trademark holders who 
benefit from incentivized registrars that are more proactive about 
preventing cybersquatting before it starts.81  Trademark holders 
who have clear rights to a domain name will also have the option 
to get quick relief from potentially dangerous redirecting or 
pirating merely by notifying registrars of potential cybersquatting, 
which triggers the duty of the registrars to stamp out egregious 
case while not forcing them to preemptively shut down closer calls 
and allowing the UDRP provisions to kick in.82  In sum, an 
interpretation of the ACPA that creates an action for contributory 
liability best serves the policy goals surrounding the intent of the 
ACPA by providing more efficient and robust protection of 
trademark rights, while setting a high enough bar to prevent 
registrars from being forced to slow down the registration process 
due to the need to conduct onerous reviews of every domain name 
they register. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Like the rapid changes that the internet has undergone since 
the creation of the ACPA in 1999, the problems arising from 
cybersquatting are constantly changing.83  To effectively police 
 
 79. See GreatDomains, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 647. 
 80. See Petronas, 737 F.3d at 548. 
 81. Contra Walczak, supra note 5, at 556–57 (proposing that the costs 
outweigh the benefits of enforcing contributory liability in ACPA cases). 
 82. But see Petronas, 737 F.3d at 548–49.  In Petronas, the court found 
secondary liability could not be applied, and thus the registrar could not be 
found liable for its mere inaction.  Id.  The purpose of allowing secondary 
liability to apply in this context is to force a registrar to act in order to protect 
itself from liability.  Such action, however, is what will further protect a 
rightful trademark owner. 
 83. Changing with the cybersquatters: the evolution of brand protection, 
WORLD TRADEMARK REV. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.worldtrademark 
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cybersquatting, it is necessary to broadly interpret and flexibly 
apply the ACPA.  Rigid interpretations, like the one employed in 
Petronas, allow cybersquatters to insulate themselves from 
efficient repercussions by dodging and dragging out lawsuits and 
arbitration, while also allowing registrars to disclaim 
responsibility of complicity in obvious cybersquatting ordeals.84  
By interpreting the ACPA against the backdrop of common law 
vicarious liability principles, in the same way courts have 
interpreted trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 
courts can effectively deter registrars from turning a blind eye to 
cybersquatting and allow trademark holders to obtain relief from 
those who hold the greatest amount of  control over domain 
names, and who are in the best position to prevent it from the 
outset, given only a small amount of oversight.85  Allowing 
contributory liability actions against domain name registrars also 
offers greater potential for the actual recovery of damages where 
harm to a mark is done, and targets litigation against parties who 
will be more willing to quickly take down infringing names in an 
efficient manner.86  Thus, the potential for contributory liability is 
likely to have the effect of reducing litigation, rather than 
increasing it, and promoting efficient internet commerce.  Because 
of this effect, courts can fulfill the goals of the statute while 
staying within its powers to interpret it.  Accordingly, if and when 
another case reaches the Supreme Court, the Court should follow 
the rationale of its prior decision in Inwood and firmly establish 
an action for contributory liability under the ACPA.87 
 
 
review.com/log/detail.aspx?g=5d4d92f6-5a20-4779-9e7b-0cd1afa1ad8e. 
 84. See Petronas, 737 F.3d at 550; Brenda R. Sharton, Domain Name 
Disputes: To Sue or Not To Sue, BOS. B.J., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 10 (for the 
proposition that ACPA “include[s] traditional claims of trademark 
infringement”).  
 85. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854–55 
(1982). 
 86. See Changing with the cybersquatters: the evolution of brand 
protection, supra note 83 (for the proposition that it can be very difficult to 
locate and pinpoint the exact registrant responsible for cybersquatting 
because of the international reach of the internet and sophisticated tactics 
used to dodge liability). 
 87. See 456 U.S. at 854–55. 
